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Highlights „Heuristic Decision Making in Network Linking“ 
Marjolein Harmsen – van Hout, Benedict Dellaert, Jean-Jacques Herings 
 
 We explore individual linking decisions in a network context by an incentivized laboratory 
experiment with mixed logit analysis. 
 The inherent complexity of this context results in two heuristic effects with substantial 
implications for OR models of network formation. 
 Individuals' choices are systematically less guided by payoff but more by simpler heuristic 
decision cues. 
 This shift from payoff to heuristic cues is systematically stronger for social payoff than for own 
payoff. 
 The specific between-subject complexity factors value transferability and social tradeoff 
aggravate the former effect. 
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Heuristic Decision Making
in Network Linking
Marjolein J.W. Harmsen - van Hout∗ Benedict G.C. Dellaert†
P. Jean-Jacques Herings‡
Abstract
Network formation among individuals constitutes an important part of many OR
processes, but relatively little is known about how individuals make their linking deci-
sions in networks. This article provides an investigation of heuristic eﬀects in individ-
ual linking decisions for network formation in an incentivized lab-experimental setting.
Our mixed logit analysis demonstrates that the inherent complexity of the network
linking setting causes individuals’ choices to be systematically less guided by payoﬀ
but more guided by simpler heuristic decision cues, and that this shift is systematically
stronger for social payoﬀ than for own payoﬀ. Furthermore, we show that the specific
complexity factors value transferability and social tradeoﬀ aggravate the former eﬀect.
These heuristic eﬀects have important research and policy implications in areas that
involve network formation.
JEL Classification: A14, C25, C91, D85
Keywords: network formation, individual decision making, heuristic eﬀects, lab-
oratory experiment, mixed logit
1 INTRODUCTION
Network formation among individuals has important eﬀects in many social, operational, and
economic contexts, ranging from word-of-mouth communications among consumers (e.g., Ia-
cobucci & Hopkins, 1992) and virtual communities (e.g., Wellman et al., 1996) to job oppor-
tunities (e.g., Granovetter, 1995) and mortality (e.g., Berkman & Syme, 1979). Therefore,
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the OR community has lately modeled such decentral network creation processes (e.g., Fab-
rikant et al., 2003; Baron et al., 2006; Monsuur, 2007; Demaine et al., 2012; Janssen &
Monsuur, 2012; Harmsen - van Hout et al., 2013; Hellmann & Staudigl, 2014; Olaizola &
Valenciano, 2014). The applications of these models vary from military and other communi-
cation networks to large-scale networking settings as the Internet and their approaches diﬀer
from non-cooperative and cooperative game theory to structural optimization mechanisms.
In the current paper, we comply with the recent call by Hämäläinen et al. (2013) to
explicitly consider behavioral phenomena within OR processes, as these processes are highly
sensitive to behavioral eﬀects. Accordingly, the abovementioned OR models on decentral
network creation may result in opposite recommendations for optimal interventions. Al-
though the approaches of these models vary in several respects, they all take optimizing
individuals as a starting point, at most with some random deviation therefrom (e.g., Baron
et al., 2006; Hellmann & Staudigl, 2014), whereas we investigate in how far real people
systematically deviate from this assumption.
There exists a recent and increasing experimental literature on network formation. One
stream in this literature is involved with testing integral game-theoretic models of network
formation. They include variants of Bala and Goyal’s (2000) noncooperative network forma-
tion model (e.g., Callander & Plott, 2005; Berninghaus et al., 2006), Jackson and Wolinsky’s
(1996) pairwise cooperative network formation model (e.g., Deck & Johnson, 2004), and fully
cooperative network formation models like Jackson and Van den Nouweland’s (2005) (e.g.,
Charness & Jackson, 2007). This research identifies several conditions under which the-
oretically stable network structures are reproduced in the laboratory and addresses their
eﬃciency. Another stream of experimental studies examines the role of network formation
as endogenously emerging in other relevant settings of cooperative decision making (e.g.,
Hauk & Nagel, 2001; Brown et al., 2004; Kirchsteiger et al., 2005; Corbae & Duﬀy, 2008; Di
Cagno & Sciubba, 2010). This research shows that cooperation decisions are considerably
influenced when individuals are allowed to choose their partners versus when a fixed inter-
action structure is imposed. Furthermore, Falk and Kosfeld (2003), Goeree et al. (2008),
and Van Dolder and Buskens (2014) found social motives in network formation.
From this experimental work it became clear that in extremely complex, dynamic and
strategic situations, predictions of network formation models are not always accurate. An
issue that has been largely ignored in this previous work though is that the complexity that
individuals face in network formation may moderate their decisions already on a much more
basic level. Also disregarding dynamics and strategic interaction, the network formation
process is typically a complex decision setting, for individuals’ utilities are not only depen-
dent on multiple characteristics of the choice options, like in most consumer choices (e.g.,
Swait & Adamowicz, 2001), and even not only additionally on the number of other individ-
uals choosing the same option, like with global network externalities (e.g., Katz & Shapiro,
1985). They depend on all individuals in the entire pattern of network links, diﬀerently
by their exact positions (e.g., Sundararajan, 2007). Furthermore, this network complexity
2
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
varies depending on whether the type of value that is exchanged through the network only
aﬀects direct neighbors or is rather transferable via indirect links (Harmsen - van Hout et
al., 2013) and depending on whether decision makers care about the eﬀects of their choices
on other individuals (Fehr & Schmidt, 2003).
Such complexity may cause errors in their evaluation of diﬀerent link formation options
and hence in their choice process. Although previous research acknowledges the mere exis-
tence of errors (e.g., Charness & Jackson, 2007), these are simply modeled as random and
the underlying process remains undisclosed. In fact, the complexity causing such errors is
typically removed by providing experimental subjects with numerical payoﬀ information in
the network linking choice interfaces. The objective of the current paper is to investigate
whether systematic heuristic shifts occur in individual decision making in network formation
as a function of complexity in the network linking setting. Such complexity eﬀects have been
studied in several other choice contexts (e.g., Timmermans, 1993; Bonner, 1994; Sung et al.,
2009; Dellaert et al., 2012).
For this purpose, we focus on a static, non-strategic network setting in which the decision
maker can choose to create or delete one link or to do nothing. uch a situation constitutes
the simplest network linking decision context, which allows us to study the eﬀects of com-
plexity under highly controlled conditions. To prevent possible confounding eﬀects that do
not originate from complexity of the network setting but from strategic interaction among
individuals, we thus analyze individual one-period decisions, so decisions of others in the
network are deliberately excluded.
A typical decision task as we study is as follows. The individual "you" in Figure 1
is connected with several other individuals in a network and is facing the one-shot choice
problem to change at most one link: her choice options are to delete one of her existing
links, so with "a" or "d", to create a link with one individual that she is currently not
directly connected to, so "b" or "c", or not to change anything. This results in a new
network structure that generates value for "you" as well as for "a" through "d", whereas
"a" through "d" do not make any changes to the network.
Figure 1: Example network formation setting.
In this individual decision-making experiment we vary three complexity factors that are
relevant in the context of network linking. The first factor is baseline opacity of choice conse-
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quences. We induce this by providing participants in some treatments with a comprehensive
payoﬀ table, which is an eﬀective way to systematically reduce complexity. The second fac-
tor is transferability of value over the network. We induce this by having participants in
some treatments derive value from direct neighbors only, which reflects a situation where
social value is derived from communication, and having participants in other treatments
derive value from direct as well as indirectly connected individuals, which reflects a situa-
tion where informational value is derived from communication. The third factor is social
tradeoﬀ between own payoﬀ and others’ payoﬀ. We induce this by informing participants in
some treatments that nobody else was aﬀected by their choices, and informing participants
in other treatments that the other participants in the room would be passively aﬀected by
their choices in a specific way.
These factors complicate the choices that individuals make about creating and maintain-
ing links in the network. We examine whether these choices therefore become systematically
less payoﬀ-motivated but more guided by simpler heuristic decision cues, and furthermore
whether this shift to heuristic cues is systematically stronger for the extent that individuals’
choices are guided by social payoﬀ, that is, the payoﬀ generated for other individuals, than
for the extent they are guided by own payoﬀ.
In order to test our hypotheses, we confront participants in the lab with multiple linking
choice situations similar to the one in Figure 1. Their choices have a direct impact on their
monetary rewards in the experiment, which diﬀer with respect to the three abovementioned
complexity factors (baseline payoﬀ opacity, value transferability, social tradeoﬀ), leading to
diﬀerent treatments. We perform a comprehensive parametric test of the hypotheses by
estimating a mixed (i.e., random parameters) logit model (McFadden, 2001; Hensher et al.,
2005) incorporating several payoﬀ and decision cue variables as well as their interactions
with the complexity factors. This allows us to investigate the impact of complex network
properties on individuals’ decisions, while allowing for heterogeneity of the decision makers.
Using this approach, we identify two cues that are merely qualitatively related to payoﬀ
but appear to have a significant additive impact on linking decisions: whether the choice
option implies a deviation from the status quo or not, and the number of direct neighbors of
the (potential) linking partner involved in the choice option. The eﬀects of these heuristic
cues are diﬀerent under the various complexity factors. Furthermore, we demonstrate that
social preferences throughout strongly rely on a numerical overview of choice consequences
(which is usually provided in the laboratory but missing in real life), since apparent pro-social
decision behavior in treatments with such an overview disappears in identical treatments
without.
In Section 2, we present our theoretical framework and hypotheses. Section 3 describes
the experimental design and the approach used for the mixed logit estimation. The results of
our experiment and hypotheses tests are reported in Section 4. At the end of this section, we
perform several robustness checks, among which whether observed shifts in behavior may
as well be captured by diﬀerences in randomness among complexity conditions. Section
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5 concludes the paper with a discussion including implications for OR decentral network
creation modelling.
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The objective of this section is to present our hypotheses about heuristic eﬀects in individ-
ual decisions of network formation and compare them to predictions on individual choice
behavior underlying the previous experimental network formation literature. The predic-
tions based on prior theories are reviewed in Section 2.1 and our hypotheses are presented
in Section 2.2.
2.1 Prior Decision Models
Economic theory (e.g., Varian, 1992, Ch. 7) models experienced utility, that is, utility on
which actual decisions are based, as follows. The experienced utility that individual  derives
from choosing option  is given by:
  =  
¡
Payoﬀ 
¢ 
where Payoﬀ  is the payoﬀ, that is, benefits minus costs, obtained by  when she chooses 
and   is a strictly increasing function. For empirical applications, a random factor can be
added (e.g., Hensher et al., 2005, Ch. 3):
  =  
¡
Payoﬀ 
¢
+ 
We refer to this as the classical payoﬀ-based model. For the example of Figure 1, this model
predicts that from the five choice options allowed, "you" chooses an option that provides
her with the highest payoﬀ.
Social preferences theory (Fehr & Schmidt, 2003) augments this model by explicitly
allowing for the fact that in addition to their own payoﬀ, individuals may take the payoﬀ for
other individuals into account when making their decisions. In this case, the experienced
utility that individual  derives from choosing option  is given by:
  =  
³
OwnPayoﬀ 
¡
OthersPayoﬀ 
¢
6=
´
+ 
where OwnPayoﬀ  is the payoﬀ personally obtained by  when she chooses  OthersPayoﬀ 
is the payoﬀ obtained by another individual  when  chooses , and   is a function reflecting
how  holds others-guided utility components in mind (e.g., inequity aversion, eﬃciency
preferences, etc.). We refer to this as the classical payoﬀ-based model extended with social
preferences. For the example of Figure 1, this model predicts that from the five choice
options allowed, "you" chooses an option that causes her subjectively optimal combination
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of payoﬀ for herself and payoﬀ for the four other individuals.
2.2 Hypotheses
Our anticipation is that these prior utility models are not suﬃcient to explain link choice
behavior due to the presence of a specific type of complexity. This complexity arises due
to local network eﬀects: an individual’s payoﬀ from her own choice now is aﬀected by all
individuals in the entire pattern of network links, diﬀerently by their exact positions (e.g.,
Sundararajan, 2007). Therefore, she finds it an inherently complex task to determine the
precise payoﬀ of linking choice options.
As humans are boundedly rational (Camerer, 1998), they cope with complexity in deci-
sion making by simplification, which commonly involves assessing a judgment object (e.g.,
linking choice option) using only the subset of properties of the object that are most ac-
cessible, that is, that come most readily to mind, rather than using all relevant properties
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999), as long as this leads them to a satisfying situation (Simon, 1956).
This is clearly illustrated in the literature about the eﬀects of task complexity in several
other contexts, like job candidate selection (Timmermans, 1993), audit judgment (Bonner,
1994), consumer choice (Swait & Adamowicz, 2001; Dellaert et al., 2012), and betting mar-
kets (Sung et al., 2009), but no empirical research to date has addressed such eﬀects in
making complex network formation decisions.
We propose two main types of heuristic shifts: (i) the complexity in the network link-
ing setting makes individuals’ choices systematically less payoﬀ-guided than predicted by
the classical payoﬀ-based model in that they are additionally motivated by other heuristic
cues (Section 2.2.1) and (ii) it makes them deviate from the predictions of the classical
payoﬀ-based model extended with social preferences in being systematically less socially
motivated (Section 2.2.2). Furthermore, we examine whether these eﬀects are stronger un-
der more complex linking decision making conditions, where we vary the presence of value
transferability and social tradeoﬀ (Section 2.2.3).
2.2.1 Payoﬀ orientation
In the network formation setting, the decision maker’s payoﬀ depends on the network struc-
ture after completion of her choice, where having more connections is on the one hand
beneficial, since they provide access to additional resources, and on the other hand costly,
for it takes time and eﬀort to maintain them. Because of network eﬀects, it is typically a
complex task for individuals to judge the exact payoﬀ consequences of link choice options and
we examine whether therefore individuals systematically deviate from payoﬀ orientation.
A psychological process of judgment simplification is encountered in the literature about
conjunctive probability assessment, which shows that individuals make predictions based on
a correlation they assume to exist between the assessment variable and some other variable
(e.g., Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994). Accordingly, individuals could partly substitute the payoﬀ
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value of a link choice option by descriptive attributes that can be determined more easily
and that are qualitatively related to it. Consequently, they could shift their orientation
from exact payoﬀ to the most basic cues (i) whether a link choice option involves actively
deleting or creating a link or rather doing nothing (Kahneman et al., 1991, describe how the
status quo is a predisposed option for decision makers), and (ii) how many direct links the
individual involved in the choice option has in the network (Freeman, 1979, describes how
the degree of a node is the most basic indicator of centrality, which in turn is the most basic
social network measure). This is in line with qualitative process theory, which suggests that
human reasoning is more likely to depend on qualitative rather than quantitative relations
(Forbus, 1993). Therefore, in our model we allow for individuals’ use of the type of action
or individual as simpler heuristic cues in addition to the precise expected payoﬀ.
We hypothesize:
H1 (reduction of payoﬀ orientation): Individuals’ network linking choices are aﬀected
less strongly by their payoﬀ consequences than predicted by the classical payoﬀ-based
model (Section 2.1) in that they are also systematically based on heuristic cues.
Pursuing the above line of reasoning, we formulate the experienced utility that individual
 may derive from choosing option  with the following heuristic cues:
  =  
¡
Payoﬀ Complexity ×
¡
Payoﬀ FormationDegree
¢¢
+  (1)
where Complexity is the network choice complexity that  is facing, Formation is a dummy
variable indicating by zero that  involves remaining with the status quo and by one that
it involves link deletion or creation, Degree is the number of direct links of an individual
with whom  deletes or creates a link in , and   is a function increasing in Payoﬀ  and
decreasing in the interaction of Complexity with Payoﬀ . For the example of Figure 1, this
model predicts that from the five choice options allowed, "you" chooses one that seems to
provide her with the highest payoﬀ, which she partly bases on the simple cues (i) whether
the option implies a deviation from the status quo (which is the case for four options) and
(ii) the degree of the node involved in the option (which varies between zero and three among
options) rather than on the quantitative amount. Since several qualitative relations exist
between the heuristic cues and payoﬀ, we do not predict the signs of their net eﬀects.
2.2.2 Social preferences
The presence of social tradeoﬀ is a further complicating factor in the network setting, im-
plying that an individual’s choices not only aﬀect her own value, but also the value for her
neighbors, her neighbors’ neighbors, etcetera (e.g., Jackson &Wolinsky, 1996; Bala & Goyal,
2000). This aspect of network formation choices makes it more complex for individuals with
social preferences to judge the exact value of link choice options, because besides their own
payoﬀ they also have to consider the payoﬀ of other individuals.
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We investigate whether individuals deal with the complexity of social tradeoﬀ by focusing
on the payoﬀ aspect that can be determined most easily (Gigerenzer et al., 1999), that is, own
payoﬀ. Therefore, we examine whether individuals tend to pay systematically less attention
to others’ payoﬀ due to the greater complexity of evaluating this social payoﬀ. In the past,
behavioral economists have found empirical evidence for social preferences. Recently, Falk
and Kosfeld (2003), Goeree et al. (2008), and Van Dolder and Buskens (2014) found social
motives in network formation, but this was in lab environments where choice complexity
was largely mitigated by explicit payoﬀ information, which directly presented participants
with the numerical payoﬀ consequences for themselves as well as for others of their choice
options. We expect a smaller influence of payoﬀ consequences for other individuals on choice
when this is not the case. Obviously, since payoﬀ for another individual is at least as opaque
as own payoﬀ, we anticipate a baseline shift from payoﬀ to heuristic cues as predicted by
H1 also for social payoﬀ. However, we additionally expect a systematic heuristic shift from
others’ to own payoﬀ when complexity is not artificially removed. This shift may be both
due to a concious shift of consideration from social to own payoﬀ and due to an unintended
stronger shift to the use of heuristic cues for social payoﬀ. Thus, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H2 (reduction of social preferences): Individuals’ network linking choices are aﬀected
less strongly by their payoﬀ consequences for other individuals than predicted by the
classical payoﬀ-based model extended with social preferences (Section 2.1) in that com-
plexity systematically reduces the impact of social payoﬀ on these choices more strongly
than the impact of own payoﬀ.
We include this heuristic eﬀect in the experienced utility that individual  derives from
choosing option  as follows:
  =  
³
OwnPayoﬀ 
¡
OthersPayoﬀ 
¢
6=  (2)
Complexity ×
³
OwnPayoﬀ 
¡
OthersPayoﬀ 
¢
6= FormationDegree
´´

where   is a function decreasing in the interaction of Complexity with ¡OthersPayoﬀ  ¢6=.
For the example of Figure 1, this model predicts that from the five choice options allowed,
"you" chooses one that seems to cause her subjectively optimal combination of payoﬀ for
herself and payoﬀ for the other individuals, where we expect the latter payoﬀ to get system-
atically less attention due to complexity.
2.2.3 Reinforcing complexity conditions
Finally, we hypothesize that in addition to the baseline opacity of choice consequences in
this context due to the fact that network externalities have to be taken into account, two
specific complexity aspects of networks may strengthen individuals’ tendencies to switch
from payoﬀ to heuristic cues orientation and to reduce their social preferences.
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Value transferability The first network factor regarded here is value transferability,
which refers to the fact that an individual derives value not only from her direct neighbors,
but also indirectly from her neighbors’ neighbors, etcetera. This network property makes it
even more complex for individuals to judge the exact payoﬀ of link choice options, because
it requires additional cognitive work to be forward-looking over indirect links. This leads to
the following hypotheses:
H3 (moderating eﬀects of value transferability):
H3a: The presence of value transferability in a network decreases the impact of payoﬀ
on an individual’s link formation choices in that it systematically increases the impact
of heuristic cues.
H3b: The presence of value transferability in a network decreases the impact of others’
payoﬀ on an individual’s link formation choices systematically more strongly than the
impact of own payoﬀ.
Social tradeoﬀ Another complexity property we consider is social tradeoﬀ, implying that
an individual’s choices not only aﬀect her own value, but also the value for her neighbors,
her neighbors’ neighbors, etcetera (cf. Section 2.2.2). This network property makes it more
complex for individuals with social preferences to judge the exact value of link choice options,
because besides their own payoﬀ they have to consider the payoﬀ of (possibly many) other
individuals, which requires extra cognitive eﬀort. Therefore, the presence of social tradeoﬀ
will not only cause a shift of preferences from others’ to own payoﬀ (H2 ), but we also expect
it to have a strengthening eﬀect on their shift from payoﬀ to heuristic cues orientation. This
can be formulated in the following hypothesis:
H4 (moderating eﬀect of social tradeoﬀ): The presence of social tradeoﬀ in a network
decreases the impact of payoﬀ on an individual’s link formation choices in that it
systematically increases the impact of heuristic cues.
We include these moderating eﬀects of complexity factors in the experienced utility that
individual  derives from choosing option  as follows:
  =  
³
OwnPayoﬀ 
¡
OthersPayoﬀ 
¢
6=  (3)
ComplexityCondition ×
³
OwnPayoﬀ 
¡
OthersPayoﬀ 
¢
6= FormationDegree
´´

where ComplexityCondition is the network choice complexity condition that  is facing -
concerning both the baseline opacity of choice consequences due to network externalities and
the reinforcing complexity of value transferability and social tradeoﬀ - and   is a function
in which the hypothesized interaction eﬀects with ComplexityCondition are included. For
the example of Figure 1, this model predicts that from the five choice options allowed,
9
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"you" chooses one that seems to cause her subjectively optimal combination of payoﬀ for
herself and payoﬀ for the other individuals, which systematically varies with the complexity
condition.
3 METHODS
In this section we describe the experimental design as well as the parametric approach used
for testing our hypotheses.
3.1 Experimental Design
Our experiment presented participants with six network formation link choice problems
similar to that in Figure 1. In these problems a participant was allowed to change at
most one direct link, that is, to delete a link that already exists between her and another
individual, to create a link between her and another individual if there is not yet one, or to
change nothing. The choice problems are illustrated in Table A.1 (1 - 3) and Table A.2 (4
- 6), Appendix A. They were created such that they represent a variety of network linking
decisions while enabling mutual comparison. The number of individuals as well as the total
number of links was kept constant in all six choice problems. Pilot studies conducted by
the authors before the experiment indicated that most other structural complexity factors
like the number of visual crossings between links did not aﬀect participants’ choices. An
exception was whether the decision maker was connected to the rest of the network at the
moment of choice or not. Therefore, three of the six choice problems involved a connected
position and the other three an isolated position for the participant. Furthermore, to avoid
unanticipated biases due to other structural factors, the order of choice problems was rotated
among participants.
To test for the hypothesized shifts in behavior due to value transferability and social
tradeoﬀ, we employed four experimental treatments where these two characteristics were
between-subjects factors. Thus, each participant faced one of four particular complexity
conditions (see Section 2.2.3). The experimental design is summarized by Table 1. Parts 1
and 2 for the treatments social and both refer to a within-subject manipulation that will be
discussed later in this section.
social tradeoﬀ
NO YES
value NO none social (part 1, part 2)
transferability YES transfer both (part 1, part 2)
Table 1: Experimental design.
10
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Each participant was confronted with a payoﬀ function matching her treatment. This
function reflects the benefits and costs of link formation according to a typical situation in
communication networks with high cost of link specificity as modelled by Harmsen - van
Hout et al. (2013). The more direct connections an individual has to maintain with other
individuals, the less she is able to specify her attention per link. Therefore, her value per link
for others declines and she also derives less value from each link with others. Two connected
agents contribute to their bilateral process of communication value creation according to a
standard Cobb—Douglas production function with as inputs the amount of time invested by
each agent in the link. High link specificity implies unit output elasticities in each bilateral
value production process and therefore low advantage of being connected with several others.
The respective payoﬀ function was explained in words to the participants in the instructions.
For a participant  in treatment none or social there was no value transferability, so
value was derived from direct neighbors only. This reflects a situation where social value is
derived from communication (Harmsen - van Hout et al., 2013). The payoﬀ function was
then given by:
Π =
⎧
⎨
⎩
P
∈
1
 if   0
0 if  = 0
where  is the set of individuals with whom i has a direct link, individual j is a neighbor
of i if  ∈ , and  = || is the number of neighbors of i, that is, the degree of i.
In the instructions, this payoﬀ function was presented by the following elementary verbal
description: "For each node you are directly linked with (we call such a node a neighbour)
you obtain points. However, there is also some cost associated with being connected: the
number of points you receive for each of your direct neighbours equals 10 divided by two
components: (i) the number of direct neighbours you have, and (ii) the number of direct
neighbours this neighbour has", supplemented with an elaborated numerical example (see
the Supplementary material, Appendix C).
For treatments transfer and both there was value transferability, so value was derived
from direct as well as indirectly connected individuals. This reflects a situation where
informational value is derived from communication (Harmsen - van Hout et al., 2013). The
payoﬀ function was then given by:
Π =
⎧
⎨
⎩
P
∈¯
P
∈P
1
 ∈˘()
2 if   0
0 if  = 0
where ¯ is the set of individuals with whom i has either a direct or an indirect link, P
is the set of paths between i and j, where a path is defined as a sequence of consecutive
links without repeated individuals, ˘ is the set of individuals on path p between i and j
excluding i and j themselves, and  is the degree of i. In the instructions, this payoﬀ
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function was formulated as "For each path that links you to some other node you obtain
points. However, there is also some cost associated with being connected: the number of
points you receive for each path that links you to some other node equals 10 divided by three
components: (i) the number of direct neighbours you have in the network, (ii) the number
of direct neighbours this other node has in the network, and (iii) the square of the number
of direct neighbours that any of the further nodes on the path between you and the other
node has in the network" and illustrated by an example (see the Supplementary material,
Appendix C).
For treatments none and transfer there was no social tradeoﬀ. The participants were
informed that nobody else was aﬀected by their choices. For treatments social and both there
was social tradeoﬀ. The participants were informed that the other individuals in the choice
problems were not reflecting real people with the ability to influence their payoﬀ, that the
payoﬀ their choices generated for these fictive individuals were determined analogously to
their own payoﬀ, and that the total payoﬀ their choices generated for these fictive individuals
would be divided equally among the other participants in the room. Thus, a simple form of
social preferences, not involving distributional issues, was evoked.
It can be checked that the six choice problems introduced above are selected such that
they each provide the opportunity to explicitly reveal social preferences in both the treat-
ments with and without value transferability. For example, in choice problem 5 (as visualized
with options’ respective payoﬀs in Table 2), in the treatments without value transferability,
participants can exhibit social preferences in the sense that while keeping their own payoﬀ
at its maximum they can choose better or worse for the others (e.g., by selecting option d
versus option c), and in the treatments with value transferability, participants can exhibit
social preferences in the sense that by giving up some of their own payoﬀ they can improve
the payoﬀ for others (e.g., again by selecting option d versus option c). The payoﬀs for the
other choice problems are given in Table A.3 in Appendix A. No information or feedback
about the tasks and choices of the other participants was provided during the experiment
in order to ensure that strategic motivations are absent.
value transferability NO value transferability YES
you others you others
nothing 5 41.67 nothing 6.39 47.5
a 0 40 a 0 46.67
b 5 31.67 b 6.94 40.45
c 5 31.67 c 6.94 40.45
d 5 38.33 d 6.25 44.17
e 3.75 36.25 e 5 40.94
f 5 38.33 f 6.25 44.17
Table 2: Payoﬀs choice problem 5.
To control for individual diﬀerences in social preferences, for participants in treatments
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social and both where payoﬀ for other participants had to be considered, an additional part
was added to the experiment. This was exactly the same as the first part, but for each choice
option the payoﬀ for the participant as well as for the others was mentioned explicitly. This
is illustrated in Figure 2. Charness et al. (2004) and Gürerk and Selten (2012) showed
that providing participants with such a comprehensive payoﬀ table is an eﬀective way to
systematically reduce complexity. The objective of this extra manipulation was to test in
how far participants take others’ payoﬀ into account when the complexity of doing so is
practically removed. Thus, for the treatments social and both, whether or not numerical
payoﬀ information was provided was incorporated as a within-subjects factor. Note that for
the treatments without social tradeoﬀ, it is obvious that participants would always choose
optimally when provided with a payoﬀ overview, so we do not bother them with such a
second part.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What do you choose?  
 
 I do nothing. This means that I earn 5 points and 15 points will be divided equally among the other participants in this room. 
 I delete the link with a. This means that I earn 0 points and 20 points will be divided equally among the other participants in this room. 
 I create a link with b. This means that I earn 5 points and 10 points will be divided equally among the other participants in this room.  
 
Figure 2: Illustration payoﬀ information.
The experiment took place in a computer lab with students and employees of various
faculties of Maastricht University, the Netherlands. The 48 male and 66 female participants
from diverse nationalities were randomly assigned to the four between-subject treatments.
Thus, the number of independent observations is larger than common in the existing experi-
mental network formation literature, e.g., Di Cagno and Sciubba (2010) run only six sessions
(with six interdependent participants each) per treatment. Participants were informed how
the payoﬀs they would earn in the experiment would be converted into cash euros afterwards,
see the Supplementary material (Appendix C) for details. After each choice, feedback was
given to the participant about the payoﬀ she earned for herself and if relevant for the other
participants in the room, and the respective maximum and minimum payoﬀs that could have
been earned in the specific choice problem. Participants could only start the experiment
after answering a number of control questions correctly to make sure the instructions were
understood correctly and after two really paid-out practice rounds with only three choice
options, see Table A.4, Appendix A. Our pilot experiments already increasingly confirmed
that the instructions were generally understood after working through the example. At the
end of the experiment participants were asked to comment on their motives and the way
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they made their choices in a debriefing part. Average earnings were 6.03.
3.2 Mixed Logit Estimation
We perform a comprehensive parametric test of our hypotheses by estimating a mixed (i.e.,
random parameters) logit model (Hensher et al., 2005). This estimation approach enables us
to establish the roles of several attributes of link options in the network formation process,
while allowing for heterogeneity across individuals. The total potential experienced utility
that individual  under treatment  derives from choosing option  in choice problem  is
aﬀected by both payoﬀ and other factors as well as the complexity treatment she is facing,
and is formalized as follows:
  = P∈   + P∈  + P∈    + P∈  
+ 1 + P∈  +   1 + P∈  
+
P
∈
1  + P∈ 2 + P∈ 3   + P∈ 4 
+
where:
 is the set of payoﬀ indices {1 2} 
 1 is the own payoﬀ generated under  when in  she chooses 
 2 is the payoﬀ generated for the other participants,
 is the set of decision cue indices {1 2} 
1 is a cue dummy variable indicating deviation from the status quo,
2 is a cue variable indicating the number of direct links of an individual
with whom a link is deleted or created,
  is a dummy variable indicating the presence of value transferability,
that is, treatment transfer or both,
 is a dummy variable indicating the presence of social tradeoﬀ,
that is, treatment social or both,
 is a dummy variable indicating the presence of numerical payoﬀ information
(within-subject manipulation), and
 is a stochastic variable drawn from a standard Gumbel distribution.
Notice that interactions between  and 2 or between ,  and 2 do not provide ad-
ditional information to 2 or the interaction between  and 2 respectively and therefore
are not included, and that interactions including both  and  do not provide additional
information to interactions only including  and therefore are not incorporated either. In-
teractions among payoﬀ and decision cue factors (e.g., between 1 and 2) are not included
due to lack of interpretability.
14
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
In random parameter , superscript  allows for heterogeneity due to individuals’ per-
sonal preferences as follows:
 =  + 
where  is a stochastic variable drawn from a normal distribution. Analogously, random
parameters are included for the baseline eﬀects of the decision cue variables on choice ().
Then, under the usual assumptions, the unconditional probability that individual  will
choose option  equals the expected value of the logit probability over all possible values
of the random parameters. Given the nature of our experimental design as described in
Section 3.1, complete orthogonality of all regressors in the logit model is not possible, but all
correlations between payoﬀs and heuristic cues as well as between own and others’ payoﬀs are
below 0.31. The model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood with NLOGIT 5.0, Econometric
Software, Inc., implementing 1000 Halton draws in the Monte Carlo simulation.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Illustrative Descriptive Results
Before turning to a more formal analysis, we first present some illustrative results for the
choices made in the diﬀerent treatments. Hereby the focus is first on choice problem 5 (Table
2), of which Table 3 gives the choice percentages in the diﬀerent treatments.
In treatment none (first row Table 3), without value transferability and social tradeoﬀ,
all participants choose one of the optimal options, that is, nothing, b, c, d, or f. However,
in treatment transfer, where value transferability is included, only 67.8% of the respective
participants chooses one of the optimal options, that is, b or c. This is in line with H3a.
Comparing none to transfer, the percentage of participants choosing to maintain the status
quo decreases from 43.3 to 17.9, and linking to b, which has a degree of one only, becomes
even more popular. This complies with the heuristic cues introduced in Section 2.2.1 for
H1.
In treatment social (second row Table 3), where social tradeoﬀ is included, while keeping
own payoﬀ optimal, one can maximize the payoﬀ for others by choosing to change nothing.
Only 10.7% of the respective participants turns out to opt for this, though all these partic-
ipants still maximize their own payoﬀ, that is, select option nothing, b, c, d, or f. However,
in the second part of the experiment, when payoﬀ information is given, thus eliminating
complexity, 53.6% of the same participants prefers this option. This pattern corresponds to
H2. Note that changing nothing maintains the status quo, which again relates to one of the
heuristic cues.
In treatment both (third row Table 3), with both value transferability and social tradeoﬀ,
only 42.9% of the respective participants chooses one of the options with optimal own payoﬀ,
that is, b or c, whereas the rest seems to be willing to give up some of their own payoﬀ
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in order to improve the payoﬀ for others. Note that 21.3% even chooses a Pareto inferior
option, that is, a, d, e, or f. However, in the second part of the experiment, when payoﬀ
information is given, thus eliminating complexity, the proportion with optimal own payoﬀ
increases to 71.4%. Also, only 3.6% chooses a Pareto inferior option. This result is in line
with H4. Notice that the option to link to e, which has the relatively high degree of three,
remains impopular in all treatments, which is in accordance with one of the heuristic cues
once more.
none
choice %
nothing 43.3
a 0.0
b 40.0
c 10.0
d 3.3
e 0.0
f 3.3
transfer
choice %
nothing 17.9
a 0.0
b 60.7
c 7.1
d 0.0
e 3.6
f 10.7
social / payoﬀ info NO
choice %
nothing 10.7
a 0.0
b 39.3
c 7.1
d 17.9
e 0.0
f 25.0
social / payoﬀ info YES
choice %
nothing 53.6
a 0.0
b 21.4
c 7.1
d 7.1
e 3.6
f 7.1
both / payoﬀ info NO
choice %
nothing 35.7
a 0.0
b 28.6
c 14.3
d 7.1
e 7.1
f 7.1
both / payoﬀ info YES
choice %
nothing 25.0
a 0.0
b 46.4
c 25.0
d 3.6
e 0.0
f 0.0
Table 3: Descriptive results choice problem 5.
In Table 4 an overview across all choice problems is provided of how often participants
choose optimally in the diﬀerent treatments and in Table 5 of how often participants max-
imized other participants’ payoﬀ given own maximal payoﬀ and how often they choose a
Pareto inferior option in the sense that both own and others’ payoﬀ could be strictly im-
proved by choosing a diﬀerent option. The tables confirm that participants were more
eﬀective in optimization the less complex the treatment.
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social tradeoﬀ
NO YES,
without payoﬀ info
YES,
with payoﬀ info
value NO 97% 89% 96%
transferability YES 47% 45% 78%
Table 4: Optimal choice in the complexity treatments.
social tradeoﬀ
YES, without payoﬀ info YES, with payoﬀ info
value
NO
max others | max own 27%
Pareto inferior 11%
max others | max own 58%
Pareto inferior 4%
transferability
YES
max others | max own 39%
Pareto inferior 30%
max others | max own 73%
Pareto inferior 7%
Table 5: Social preferences in the complexity treatments.
social tradeoﬀ
NO YES,
without payoﬀ info
YES,
with payoﬀ info
value NO 24% 11% 36%
transferability YES 21% 24% 14%
Table 6: Remaining with the connected status quo in the complexity treatments.
social tradeoﬀ
NO YES,
without payoﬀ info
YES,
with payoﬀ info
value NO 0.83 0.96 0.90
transferability YES 1.36 1.26 1.00
Table 7: Average degree of the nodes involved in the chosen options in the complexity
treatments.
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In Table 6 we count frequencies of how often participants remained with the status quo
in the three choice problems where the decision maker is not isolated, as in the three choice
problems with an isolated start position, remaining with the status quo is consistently very
bad for payoﬀ and was chosen accordingly rarely in all treatments. Prominent diﬀerences
appear in the treatments with social tradeoﬀ: in social without payoﬀ information, the
percentage of status quo choices is considerably lower than in social with payoﬀ information
(and even lower than when each of the seven choice options would have been chosen with
equal probability), whereas in both without payoﬀ information, the percentage of status quo
choices is considerably higher than in both with payoﬀ information. In Table 7 the average
degree of the nodes involved in the chosen options across all problems is listed. With random
choice, the average degree would be 1.31, and with a random selection of one of the options
that provide optimal own payoﬀ, the average degree would be 0.98 and 1.06 without and
with value transferability respectively. Thus, in treatment none participants over-selected
low-degree options and in the treatments with value transferability (and no payoﬀ overview)
participants over-selected high-degree options.
The above crosstab results are in line with our hypotheses, but cannot be interpreted
as direct evidence, since alternative explanations for diﬀerences between choice frequencies
in the treatments are possible. For example, it could be that all diﬀerences in complexity
just lead to diﬀerences in choice precision, implying that allowing for conditional random
error terms in network formation modelling would be suﬃcient, whereas we hypothesize
more systematic changes in decision making. Also, even though we restricted our focus to
the very simple setting of a static, non-strategic network in which the decision maker can
choose to create or delete one link or to do nothing, it could be that confounding eﬀects
play a role, for instance, the exact payoﬀs in the treatments with value transferability are by
definition diﬀerent from those in the treatments without (although the order of magnitude
of these diﬀerences is relatively small). In the mixed logit approach in the next section these
alternative explanations can be accounted for. Namely, confounding eﬀects are dealt with
by the comprehensiveness of the model itself, where for example both exact payoﬀs and
simple heuristic cues are included as explanatory variables. Explicit comparison to shifts in
randomness is made in the last robustness check of Section 4.2.2.
Notice that we did not hypothesize that the payoﬀ derived from heuristic network linking
decisions would be far from optimal. In fact, across all choice problems, participants earned
a fraction of 0.9 from the own payoﬀs they could have earned in the treatments social part
1, transfer, and both part 1, and even 0.99 in the treatment none, whereas pure random
selection would only have lead to a proportion of 0.8 from the own payoﬀs that could have
been earned. So in that sense, if heuristics were used, they may be considered rather "smart"
(cf. Gigerenzer et al., 1999).
Further descriptive results, primarily from the debriefing part, are given in Appendix B.
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4.2 Mixed Logit Results
A comprehensive parametric test of the hypotheses is conducted by estimating a mixed logit
model across all treatments (Section 4.2.1). A p-value of 0.05 is taken as cut-oﬀ value for
significance. In Section 4.2.2 several robustness checks are performed.
4.2.1 Hypothesized model
The estimation results for all experimental treatments including the interaction eﬀects of an
explicit payoﬀ overview are given in Table 8.
In these results we find support for the reduction of payoﬀ orientation in this complex
setting (H1), since besides the own payoﬀ, the degree of the individual involved in the choice
option appears to be significantly influential on a linking decision, where individuals with
many links are avoided in comparison with relatively isolated individuals (negative 2). This
might be based on the qualitative notion that maintaining links is costly. For the treatments
with social payoﬀ, where the within-subjects factor of numerical payoﬀ information was
included, this is reconfirmed by the positively significant 11-coeﬃcient, indicating that
when participants were provided with such a comprehensive payoﬀ overview, the impact of
payoﬀ on their linking choices increased.
With respect to the expected reduction of social preferences in the network formation
context (H2 ), we find strong confirmation as the 2-coeﬃcient is not significant at all,
whereas in the situation where participants were provided with numerical payoﬀ information,
the corresponding coeﬃcient (12) is positively significant, showing that the same individuals
were more willing to consider the consequences of their choices for others than they actually
did in the first round of the experiment. Also, this eﬀect is stronger than for own payoﬀ,
since in the treatments with social tradeoﬀ, exact own payoﬀ is still considered, as |1|  1.
The hypothesized moderating eﬀects of value transferability are supported with respect
to the reduction of payoﬀ orientation (H3a): the 1-coeﬃcient of the payoﬀ interaction term
turns out to be negatively significant. We see that instead, participants stuck significantly
more to the status quo (negative 1) and reversed their preference for isolated versus central
individuals (2). The former might be subscribed to the fact that it is now more complex
to calculate what it brings to deviate from already satisfying situations, whereas the latter
might be due to the qualitative notion that since value is now transferable over indirect links,
having more links is more beneficial. Since others’ payoﬀ were already completely ignored in
the choices of the participants, it is no longer possible for the additional complexity factor
value transferability to significantly decrease their eﬀect (H3b).
The hypothesized moderating eﬀect of social tradeoﬀ on payoﬀ orientation (H4 ) is cor-
roborated as well, for the 1-coeﬃcient is also significantly negative. Here, respondents had
the tendency to deviate from the status quo (positive 1). This overactivity might be related
to the fact that it is complex to calculate whether situations satisfying with respect to own
payoﬀ will be also beneficial for the others now involved, which suggests that some latent
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social motives are still present, but the situation is too complex to deal with them like in
the less complex part with direct payoﬀ information.
variable
para-
meter
estimated
mean
(p-value)
estimated
st. dev.
(p-value)
cf.
hyp.
own payoﬀ 1 1.814 (0.000) 0.476 (0.000)
others’ payoﬀ 2 -0.014 (0.732) 0.135 (0.000) 2
formation 1 0.501 (0.232) 1.023 (0.000) 1
degree 2 -0.848 (0.000) 0.165 (0.252) 1
transferability * own payoﬀ 1 -1.075 (0.002) 3
transferability * others’ payoﬀ 3 -0.022 (0.689) 3
transferability * formation 1 -1.456 (0.012) 3
transferability * degree 2 1.500 (0.000) 3
social tradeoﬀ * own payoﬀ 1 -1.133 (0.001) 4
social tradeoﬀ * formation 1 1.444 (0.039) 4
social tradeoﬀ * degree 2 -0.117 (0.723) 4
transferability * social tradeoﬀ * own payoﬀ  1.261 (0.002)
transferability * social tradeoﬀ * formation 1 -1.450 (0.117)
transferability * social tradeoﬀ * degree 2 0.034 (0.930)
payoﬀ info * own payoﬀ 11 0.872 (0.002) 1
payoﬀ info * others’ payoﬀ 12 0.136 (0.004) 2
payoﬀ info * formation 21 -1.992 (0.009)
payoﬀ info * degree 22 0.477 (0.196)
payoﬀ info * transferability * own payoﬀ 31 0.518 (0.201)
payoﬀ info * transferability * others’ payoﬀ 32 -0.098 (0.159)
payoﬀ info * transferability * formation 41 3.136 (0.002)
payoﬀ info * transferability * degree 42 -0.983 (0.044)
Table 8: Mixed logit estimations.
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Finally, respondents’ behavior significantly varies among participants in several respects
as can be concluded from the significant random parameter standard deviations in the next
to last column of Table 8.
4.2.2 Robustness
In this section, we check whether our estimation results are robust for several control vari-
ables.
Order eﬀects The model is re-estimated where additionally interaction terms are included
of each of the four main variables (i.e. those with a random parameter) with a control
variable tracking the position of the respective option in the list of choice options, to check
for robustness against order eﬀects. We find one small but significant order eﬀect: the
interaction eﬀect of others’ payoﬀ with the order variable is 0.004 (0.005), indicating that
others’ payoﬀ becomes systematically slightly more relevant for lower-listed choice options.
Importantly, almost all previously found heuristic eﬀects remain. The single exception is the
positive interaction eﬀect of social tradeoﬀ with formation (1), which becomes insignificant
now (p-value 0.202). However, the interaction eﬀect of social tradeoﬀ and own payoﬀ (1)
remains significantly negative, indicating that H4 still holds, but suggesting that there is a
shift to some heuristic cue left unidentified in the current pioneering model.
Learning eﬀects The model is re-estimated for the first part of the experiment only
(without numerical payoﬀ information) - for the second part of the experiment, when payoﬀ
tables are provided to the same participants, it is not straightforward how to extend the
definition of the experience variable - where additionally interaction terms are included of
each of the four main variables with a control variable measuring experience by tracking
how many problems the participant already solved at the respective moment of choice,
to check for robustness against learning eﬀects. We find that almost all previously found
heuristic eﬀects remain, with the same exception as at the robustness check against order
eﬀects described above. It turns out that more experienced individuals have a significantly
stronger tendency to avoid individuals with many links, so the heuristic eﬀects in network
formation decisions as explored in the current paper are definitely not transitory.
Random shift eﬀects Finally, we compare our model to a more restricted model where
instead of including the specific interaction eﬀects for the treatments, we only allow the
variance of the error term to linearly depend on them, to check whether diﬀerences among
treatments as predicted by H2 through H4 are possibly merely due to shifts in choice
precision (Salisbury & Feinberg, 2010), so whether more complexity only leads to more
randomness. This rival model turns out to perform significantly worse in terms of model fit
(the loglikelihood decreases from -1540.872 to -1647.825), strengthening our claim of more
systematic eﬀects of complexity on link choice behavior.
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5 DISCUSSION
5.1 Conclusions
A concise summary of our results is given in Table 9.
hypothesis result
heuristic eﬀects of complexity on linking choice
H1: reduction of payoﬀ supported (low degree as heuristic cue in baseline)
orientation
H2: reduction of social supported (numerical payoﬀ necessary to consider
preferences other individuals’ payoﬀ at all)
moderating eﬀects of specific complexity factors
H3: value transferability supported for reduction of payoﬀ orientation (high
degree and remaining with status quo as heuristic cues);
social preferences could not be further reduced
H4: social tradeoﬀ supported (deviating from status quo as heuristic cue)
Table 9: Summary experimental results.
The hypothesis that individuals’ network linking choices are aﬀected less strongly by their
payoﬀ consequences than predicted by the classical payoﬀ-based model (H1 ) is supported
by the mixed logit estimation of Section 4.2.1, as it indicates that these choices are also
based on heuristic cues. Already in the baseline treatment where payoﬀs are obscured due
to network externalities, a lower degree of the node involved in the option significantly
explains choice whereas the exact payoﬀ was also included as an explanatory variable. In
the treatments with value transferability, higher degrees become significantly more attractive
and remaining with the status quo becomes an additional heuristic cue. In the treatments
with social tradeoﬀ, we even find a reverse status quo bias, which is quite unique in the
literature (cf. Mengel, 2011), but this requires further research as it is not robust against
order and learning eﬀects. These results are also reflected in the descriptive Tables 6 and 7
in Section 4.1.
The hypothesis that individuals’ network linking choices are aﬀected less strongly by
their payoﬀ consequences for other individuals than predicted by the classical payoﬀ-based
model extended with social preferences due to a systematic shift of motivation from social
to own payoﬀ (H2 ) is strongly supported by the mixed logit estimation, as it indicates that
these choices do not merely become more socially motivated when the complexity is largely
removed by a comprehensive payoﬀ overview (as reflected in descriptive Table 5 in Section
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4.1), but they are even not socially motivated at all without such a numerical table. Indeed,
the impact of own payoﬀ on choices does not suﬀer to this extent from the same level of
complexity. Note that some respondent answers in the debriefing part of the experiment
suggest that this shift of the impact from social to own payoﬀ as a consequence of social
tradeoﬀ is partly due to a a concious shift of consideration away from social payoﬀ (Appendix
B, item 5). Our explanation of the reverse status quo bias in Section 4.2.1 suggests that it is
also partly due to an unintended stronger shift to the use of heuristic cues for social payoﬀ.
The hypothesized moderating eﬀects of the complexity factors value transferability and
social tradeoﬀ (H3, H4 ) are also supported by the mixed logit estimation, as their presence
further decreases the impact of payoﬀ on an individual’s link formation choices, which is
also reflected in descriptive Table 4 in Section 4.1.
Thus, this study shows that complexity in the network formation setting influences in-
dividual link choice behavior in a systematic way, since individuals’ choices are guided less
by payoﬀ, where the attention appears to be shifted to factors only qualitatively related to
payoﬀ, and moreover, this eﬀect is stronger for social payoﬀ than for own payoﬀ. Further-
more, we demonstrate that the specific complexity factors value transferability and social
tradeoﬀ aggravate the former eﬀect. In Section 4.2.2 (Random shift eﬀects) it was confirmed
that these changes in behavior cannot accurately be captured by a model only allowing for
diﬀerences in choice precision (or randomness) among complexity treatments.
5.2 Implications
The current study initiates empirical research into the issue of heuristic eﬀects in individual
decisions of network formation. Our results should raise interest in future research into this
realm, for they have important implications for theoretical and experimental research as
well as application areas of network formation.
Our results show that behavioral eﬀects play a crucial role in the process of decentral
network formation. Therefore, theoretical OR models of network creation (e.g., Fabrikant
et al., 2003; Baron et al., 2006; Monsuur, 2007; Demaine et al., 2012; Janssen & Monsuur,
2012; Harmsen - van Hout et al., 2013; Hellmann & Staudigl, 2014; Olaizola & Valenciano,
2014) should take such eﬀects into consideration. In particular, the current experiment was
based on payoﬀ functions used in Harmsen - van Hout et al. to model communication net-
work formation with high link specificity. This kind of models should not only allow for
random error to become more realistic, but should explicitly include human tendencies as
found by our analysis to base complex linking decisions on heuristic cues like status quo and
node degree rather than exact payoﬀ. As seen in Section 4.1, the consequences for payoﬀs in
the simplest setting may not be very high, but it may very well be expected that the struc-
tural and eﬃciency predictions and therefore recommendations for interventions resulting
from these more complex models diﬀer largely if their agents are no longer optimizing but
consider much simpler decision cues instead (cf. Hämäläinen et al., 2013). For example,
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the model with high link specificity by Harmsen - van Hout et al. predicted a wide range
of networks in situations without value transferability, including non-standard networks like
highly connected and "small world" networks, and highly fragmented, eﬃcient networks in
situations with value transferability. Similarly, predictions were made for other levels of link
specificity and several recommendations for network moderation were based hereupon. It
should be investigated in how far these still hold with agents behaving heuristically rather
than purely optimizing.
On the other hand, our results suggest that the existent network formation models are
already correct in not taking social preferences into account, for though previous laboratory
research indicated that people do have them, we show that the complex decision environment
keeps them from being revealed.
Furthermore, experimental research practice is often disposed to make the payoﬀ conse-
quences of choices as transparent as possible for participants to prevent biased findings due
to their wrong understanding of the instructions. However, we claim that this explicit infor-
mation modifies participants’ behavior in a systematic way, since it eliminates complexity
that they otherwise would handle by heuristic shifts.
Finally, in many contexts of network formation among individuals such as job oppor-
tunities (e.g., Granovetter, 1995) and mortality (e.g., Berkman & Syme 1979), it matters
to be aware of heuristic eﬀects as found in this study. For example, with word-of-mouth
communications among consumers (e.g., Iacobucci & Hopkins, 1992), for the supplier of the
respective product or service it is interesting to know when consumers have a tendency to
talk with isolated or central peers and that they neglect benefits that peers derive from
their communication decisions. Also, suppliers can exploit the finding that this behavior
is dependent on the complexity of the network environment, for example, by facilitating
information about social payoﬀs.
5.3 Future Research
Diverse linear transformations to convert points earned to euro payments - which we used
over complexity conditions to equalize the average monetary rewards with which our par-
ticipants leave the laboratory - might influence decisions (Maddox et al., 2003). Although
we think it unlikely that participants in our experiment were able to comprehend more than
the fact that earning more points would increase their ultimate monetary payoﬀ as well (see
the Supplementary material, Appendix C), further work could account for this in another
way.
In order to prevent interference of complexity types that are not the focus of the current
research, we studied a relatively simple network linking decision that is only one-shot and
involves only one active participant changing at most one link. Also, the payoﬀ information
is complete and certain. Future research could study whether and in how far additional (and
often previously studied) complexity types such as strategic interaction, dynamics, multi-link
24
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
deviation, incomplete information, and uncertainty strengthen the heuristic eﬀects shown
by the current paper.
Furthermore, in this pioneering study we could find significant shifts from exact payoﬀ
to the descriptive attributes qualitatively related to it that to the best of our knowledge can
be determined most easily by a decision maker, namely remaining with vs. deviating from
the status quo and the degree centrality of a node. Issues like cognitive distinctions between
deleting and creating a link or between connectedness and disconnectedness of the decision
maker could be considered in future work, as well as decision cues based on more advanced
centrality or other social network measures, e.g., the number of nodes reached at a distance
of two. Similarly, follow-up experiments could investigate the eﬀects of demographics and
other background variables as collected in Appendix B if explicitly designed to do so.
Another direction that future studies could take concerns the question in how far the
complexity types and heuristic eﬀects we considered are specific for the network context. For
example, in how far does complexity systematically reduce social preferences in other choice
settings? Moreover, further experiments could generate deeper insights in the linking choice
process of individuals by concentrating on specific eﬀects from the rich range of heuristic
tendencies explored here.
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APPENDIX A: CHOICE PROBLEMS
1
What do you choose?  
 
 I do nothing. 
 I delete the link with a. 
 I delete the link with b. 
 I create a link with c. 
 I create a link with d. 
 I create a link with e. 
 I delete the link with f.  
 
2
What do you choose?  
 
 I do nothing. 
 I create a link with a. 
 I create a link with b. 
 I create a link with c. 
 I create a link with d. 
 I create a link with e. 
 I create a link with f.  
 
3
What do you choose?  
 
 I do nothing. 
 I delete the link with a. 
 I create a link with b. 
 I create a link with c. 
 I create a link with d. 
 I create a link with e. 
 I create a link with f.  
 
Table A.1: Choice problems 1 - 3.
4
What do you choose?  
 
 I do nothing. 
 I create a link with a. 
 I create a link with b. 
 I create a link with c. 
 I create a link with d. 
 I create a link with e. 
 I create a link with f.  
 
5
What do you choose?  
 
 I do nothing. 
 I delete the link with a. 
 I create a link with b. 
 I create a link with c. 
 I create a link with d. 
 I create a link with e. 
 I create a link with f.  
 
6
What do you choose?  
 
 I do nothing. 
 I create a link with a. 
 I create a link with b. 
 I create a link with c. 
 I create a link with d. 
 I create a link with e. 
 I create a link with f.  
 
Table A.2: Choice problems 4 - 6.
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indirect payoﬀs: NO indirect payoﬀs: YES
1 you others you others
nothing 6.67 26.67 nothing 8.33 32.92
a 5 25 a 7.5 30.31
b 7.5 37.5 b 8.75 42.5
c 6.25 21.25 c 7.5 26.48
d 7.5 27.5 d 8.75 34.45
e 6.25 21.25 e 7.5 26.48
f 7.5 37.5 f 8.75 42.5
2 you others you others
nothing 0 33.33 nothing 0 41.25
a 5 33.33 a 6.58 41.51
b 3.33 32.22 b 5.03 39.72
c 5 33.33 c 6.58 41.51
d 5 35 d 6.25 42.5
e 2.5 32.5 e 4.06 39.14
f 3.33 32.22 f 5.03 39.72
3 you others you others
nothing 5 45 nothing 6.72 51.09
a 0 45 a 0 51.25
b 5 35 b 7.11 44
c 5 35 c 7.11 44
d 5 40 d 6.64 46.56
e 4.17 39.17 e 5.83 44.58
f 4.17 40.83 f 5.38 45.59
4 you others you others
nothing 0 27.5 nothing 0 35.31
a 5 30 a 6.05 37.15
b 2 26 b 3.5 32.7
c 5 30 c 6.05 37.15
d 5 27.5 d 6.52 35.74
e 3.33 26.67 e 4.93 34.24
f 5 30 f 6.05 37.15
6 you others you others
nothing 0 38.33 nothing 0 43.33
a 3.33 38.89 a 4.57 43.58
b 2.5 37.5 b 3.91 42.03
c 5 40 c 6.18 44.79
d 5 33.33 d 7.5 40.83
e 5 33.33 e 7.5 40.83
f 3.33 38.89 f 4.57 43.58
Table A.3: Payoﬀs choice problems 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6.
p1
   What do you choose?  
 
 I do nothing. 
 I delete the link with a. 
 I delete the link with b.  
 
p2
What do you choose?  
 
 I do nothing. 
 I delete the link with a. 
 I create a link with b.  
 
Table A.4: Practice rounds.
29
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS
1. Duration: average 40,2 min., stand. dev. 14,8 min.
2. Almost all participants tried to earn as much as possible, whereas 17 subjects indicated other
goals: best choices (6), fun / interest (2), optimal own payoﬀs and not too bad payoﬀs for
the others (4), optimal own payoﬀs and minimal payoﬀs for the others (1), structural goals
(4).
3. In the first choice problem (practice round), participants chose as follows: at random: 1, by
calculation: 60, by intuition: 34, using a rule: 13, namely connect to the one with the least
neighbors / shortest paths (13), otherwise: 6, namely mix of intuition and calculation (5),
mistake in understanding instructions at first (1).
4. Thereafter, did participants change their strategies? No: 67, for the strategy was good or
convenient and the problems were similar, yes: 47, switch (more) to calculation (12), intuition
/ experience (22), or rule mentioned in descriptive 3. (11), or consider other participants
more (2).
5. In conditions social and both, did participants take into account the points created for other
participants? 36 did not, since they didn’t think about it (4), didn’t care about it (16), didn’t
know how (5) or didn’t like the eﬀort (11), 20 did, where they (conditionally) maximized
(≥ 8) or minimized (≥ 3) the points for the others, two participants seem not to understand
that dividing among other participants does not include yourself.
6. Strategies in the second part (with numerical payoﬀ information) of conditions social and
both: (conditionally) maximizing payoﬀs for the others (25), choosing not too badly for the
others (7), (conditionally) minimizing payoﬀs for the others (6), trying to repeat first part
(8), unclear (10).
7. Strategic considerations in conditions social and both? No: 18, since they didn’t think
about it (7), thought that the other participants wouldn’t care (5), the other participants
are outside control (4), or it would be too diﬃcult (2), yes, but did not influence choices:
9, yes, hoping for a favorable group: 5, or expecting an unfavorable group: 2, yes, unclear
how: 22 (at least five of these seem not to understand that this question is about the others
creating points for you and not about you creating points for the others).
8. Diﬃculties were mentioned in the following fields: calculation: 33, choice complexity: 35,
instructions: 26, equivalent options: 5, none: 16.
9. Further remarks: interesting / nice: 12, want to know more about the experiment: 10,
confirming what was said before: 5, suggestions: 10.
10. Age: average 22,5 yrs., stand. dev.: 3,4 yrs.
11. Male: 48, female: 66.
12. Dutch: 40, German: 43, Chinese: 9, other: 22.
13. Faculty of Economics & Business Administration: 90, other: 24.
14. 90 participants did not participate in a similar experiment before; 24 did.
15. 112 participants would like to participate in future experiments, two would not.
16. In conditions social and both: 40 participants did not know any of their fellow session
participants, 12 knew one and four knew more.
APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The experimental instructions associated with this article can be found in the online version, at
http://dx.doi .org/...
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